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The Role of Timing in the Business Model 
Evolution of Spinoffs
The Case of C3 Technologies
Timing should not be confused with speed in the development of successful spinoffs.
Mattias Axelson and Erik Bjurström
OVERVIEW: The view of time that dominates conventional management thinking, including the Lean Startup movement’s 
“fail fast and pivot” approach, often leads to failure in the business model evolution of new ventures spinning off from estab-
lished firms. Timing is critical for spinoffs because it is a key element of the balance between minimizing risk and maximizing 
opportunity. In the literature on business model evolution and lean startups, however, the issue of timing is given limited 
consideration. To address this issue, we present and analyze the role of timing in the business model evolution of C3 Technologies, 
a spinoff from Saab. The results offer insight regarding the use of managed timing to allow evolutionary processes to let the 
right moment present itself—and enable the organization to move quickly to seize the moment. This approach allows man-
agers to control the evolutionary process despite the high uncertainty associated with exploring new business models.
KEYWORDS: Lean Startup, Business model design, Spinoffs
Spinoffs offer a way for firms to realize the latent commercial 
value of existing technology outside their core business lines 
(Parhankangas and Arenius 2003). The potential value of spin-
ning off technology is high, since these new ventures can benefit 
from the incumbents’ resources, such as technical know-how, 
intellectual property, and experience in scaling a business. 
However, although many companies spin off new businesses, 
those attempts frequently fail (Bertels, Koen, and Elsum 2015).
One reason for the high failure rates is that managers 
lack knowledge about how to explore functioning business 
models in a cost-efficient and low-risk way (Chesbrough 
2010). Certainly, as the process of designing a productive 
business model begins, uncertainty is high and the value 
of the technology cannot be predicted (Euchner and 
Ganguly 2014; McGrath 2010). The Lean Startup move-
ment (Blank 2013; Reis 2011), which advocates an itera-
tive, experimental approach to business model evolution, 
has gained momentum in response to these realities. Lean 
Startup is a process for perceiving and resolving uncer-
tainty through validated learning (Reis 2011); Blank 
(2013) describes it as “evidence-based entrepreneurship.” 
A key principle is to “fail fast and pivot” to avoid investing 
too much in ideas that have limited business potential 
(Reis 2011).
The idea is compelling, but it relies on a conventional, 
linear view of time as merely clock time. That view privileges 
speed—evidenced in the emphasis in much of the literature 
on, for example, being first to market—in a way that can 
be problematic. There is another understanding of time as 
event-based (Kunisch et al. 2017); this conception of time 
is more in line with the evolution of business models. This 
understanding, which approaches the role of serendipity in 
innovation from the perspective of Pasteur’s adage that 
“chance favors the prepared mind” (Liu and De Rond 2016, 
p. 432), may be useful in addressing knowledge problems 
in entrepreneurial action (see Townsend et  al. 2018) in 
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relation to windows of opportunity (Huy 2001; Tyre and 
Orlikowski 1994).
This view of time adds an important perspective that is 
particularly useful in complex markets. For example, in 
situations where a new product or service may not be 
immediately appreciated by potential customers, demand 
may take time to develop. Furthermore, organizational 
competence, partnership expertise, and customer relation-
ships need time to develop before a testable hypothesis, 
such as a new value proposition, can be fully articulated. 
Thus, testing new business ideas in the market means deal-
ing with both market timing and resource timing—and that 
timing won’t always allow for a “fail fast” approach that is 
tethered to clock time. Understanding these different con-
ceptions of time is important for the evolution of a spinoff’s 
business model because getting it right—properly balancing 
the two understandings of time—is a key to striking the 
right balance between minimizing risk and maximizing 
opportunity.
In the literature on business model evolution and Lean 
Startup, however, the issue of timing has been given lim-
ited consideration (see, for instance, Bertels, Koen, and 
Elsum 2015; Blank and Dorf 2012; Chesbrough 2017; Reis 
2011, 2017). As a result, little is known about the specific 
role of timing in the evolution of a spinoff’s business 
model.
To address this issue, we present a case study of C3 
Technologies, a spinoff from Saab that was eventually 
acquired by Apple for $240 million. C3’s story offers insight 
into the value of managed timing as a cautious and reactive 
approach that can allow managers to control the evolution-
ary process despite the high uncertainty associated with 
exploring new business models. Practically, the C3 case sug-
gests that a new venture may have a better chance of success 
if it proves itself on the market before being extensively 
financed.
The Evolution of the Spinoff Business Model
Spinoffs are particularly common in knowledge- and 
technology-intensive industries. In this context, Clarysse, 
Wright, and Van de Veld (2011) show that spinoffs that 
have clear and focused technological bases are well 
placed to grow quickly. Spinoffs founded from an incum-
bent’s technology base are more likely to survive than 
startups created by independent entrepreneurs (Agarwal 
et al. 2004; Zook 2016). Another factor that influences 
the success or failure of a spinoff is the configuration of 
its business model, defined as how it creates value for 
customers and converts that value into profit (Zott and 
Amit 2007).
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) showed how busi-
ness models created by spinoffs played a central role in 
realizing the value of technology developed by Xerox. The 
best financial results are often achieved by spinoffs that 
develop business models that diverge from those used by 
the parent company (Chesbrough 2003). They emphasized 
the importance of adapting the business model to the 
unique market context facing the spinoff, rather than 
building on the business model logics of the sponsoring 
incumbent; others have echoed this principle (see, for 
instance, Miller and Floricel 2004). Hence, understanding 
the business model evolution of spinoffs is central to 
realizing the latent potential of technology.
Every business model has a market side and a resource 
side (Massa, Tucci, and Afuha 2017). Zott and Amit (2007) 
and Teece (2010) characterize business models as systemic 
answers to the question of how a company creates and cap-
tures value by interconnecting the resource side and the mar-
ket side. This definition pinpoints the challenge of new 
ventures—to discover both what will create value for cus-
tomers and how to harvest that value to generate profits. 
Discovering value creation potential does not necessarily lead 
to value capturing. Hence, the evolution of a business model 
in the case of a spinoff venture can be seen as a process of 
defining the formula for value creation in relation to value 
capture.
Business models are often not defined at the start of new 
ventures; instead, they evolve over time through interaction 
with the market (Dmitriev et al. 2014; Mullins and Komisar 
2009). Indeed, business models often emerge through a tri-
al-and-error learning process (Sosna, Trevinyo-Rodríguez, 
and Ramakrishna Velamuri 2010). Lean Startup offers one 
framework for such a trial-and-error process, providing an 
experimental methodology as a means of resolving uncer-
tainty (York 2018).
Although Lean Startup provides an attractive meth-
odology for incumbent companies considering spinoffs 
as a way to realize latent value outside their core busi-
ness areas, it is still implicated in conventional, linear 
thinking about time and timing. Conventional business 
approaches to exploring new business models are deeply 
concerned with notions such as time to market and 
return on investment (especially how long it will take 
to realize the hoped-for return). In this regard, Lean 
Startup shares its perspective with management effi-
ciency and control practices such as just-in-time inven-
tory management and fiscal-year budgeting (Orlikowski 
and Yates 2002).
The literature of Lean Startup also mirrors that of con-
ventional management approaches in its scant attention to 
time. When researchers and thinkers do consider time, they 
rely on the standard concept of clock time and maintain 
conventional valuing of speed, arguing, for example, that 
experiments should be limited to a few weeks (Reis 2011). 
However, this traditional notion of time is less relevant to 
Testing new business ideas in the 
market means dealing with both 
market timing and resource timing.
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innovation practices than it is to conventional management 
disciplines (Reinecke and Ansari 2015). Rather, Reinecke 
and Ansari argue, time should be considered relative, defined 
by the context in which the company operates. When evolv-
ing a new business model in a largely unknown context, 
incumbents cannot rely on prior knowledge of conditions 
such as customer understanding and relationship maturity 
or on prior experience of how long it takes for these elements 
to emerge. Thus, the ideal speed of development is not sim-
ply a matter of clock time—being fastest—but rather a matter 
of finding the right time—the moment when the resources 
and the market align.
This perspective is necessary to the process of business 
model evolution. Lean Startup is correct in its assertion that 
the uncertainties around the design of a new business model 
may be resolved through experimental testing; however, the 
time required for learning and experimentation to generate 
understanding is necessarily not linear. Both the resource 
and market sides of the business model must be discovered, 
and the time required by this discovery process is relative and 
context dependent—not linear or definable in advance. 
Hence, learning has to be allowed to occur within the specific 
context of the spinoff and its projected market, and decisions 
about when to move forward with business model evolution 
need to reflect that context.
The Lean Startup literature has yet to offer a consideration 
of this issue. Another approach is needed to help managers 
deal with issues of timing. Against this background, we 
designed a case study to explore the role of timing in the 
evolution of a spinoff business model.
The Study
To address the question of timing in evolving a spinoff busi-
ness model, we used a case study methodology to gain 
in-depth understanding of the many complex aspects of busi-
ness model evolution. We began with theoretical sampling 
(Eisenhardt, Graebner, and Soneshein 2016), selecting for 
our case a company that was representative of a larger pop-
ulation of spinoffs, thereby enhancing empirical relevance of 
the knowledge generated. To select that case, we established 
three criteria; we sought a spinoff that a) was from a well-es-
tablished company, b) had been built on technology devel-
oped by the incumbent, and c) had successfully entered a 
new product–market position with a new business model.
C3 Technologies, a Saab spinoff, met all three criteria: it 
was built on technology that Saab had developed for a par-
ticular market, but the company recognized that the technol-
ogy had potential outside its core business and spun off C3 
to explore that potential.
The primary source of data was 12 interviews with individ-
uals involved in the development of C3 Technologies, including 
two of the spinoff’s CEOs and three members of its board (Table 
1). We selected as interviewees people who could offer differ-
ent perspectives on the company’s evolution. Each interview 
lasted one and a half to two and a half hours; interviews were 
semi-structured. A series of open-ended questions was used 
to elicit information about the evolution of the spinoff’s 
business model. The interviews were recorded, and the inter-
viewers made notes in order to enable analysis of key results.
We also collected secondary data in the form of both 
internal documents—such as business plans and presenta-
tions of the model Saab used to spin off the company—and 
external documents, such as newspaper articles and other 
information about C3 Technologies, its product, and its 
eventual acquisition by Apple. Using different data sources 
allows for triangulation and validation of observations. To 
provide further validation of the data and avoid drawing 
misleading conclusions, we participated in a data feedback 
meeting with the managers engaged in the development of 
C3 Technologies.
Data were processed using an inductive data reduction 
methodology (Eisenhardt 1989). The analytical process 
started with categorization of the data, using categories drawn 
from the literature of business model design; we initially used 
Osterwalder and Pigneur’s (2010) business model canvas to 
structure the data. The categories were kept open-ended 
during the analytical process, allowing existing categories to 
develop and new categories to emerge from the increasing 
understanding of the specifics of the empirical data (Laamanen 
and Wallin 2009). The actual analytical process was therefore 
not linear, but iterative, moving between writing, reviewing 
field notes, listening to recorded interviews, and creating and 
reviewing new categories. An important part of that process 
was the comparative analyses of the empirical categories in 
relation to theoretical business model constructs (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967).
TABLE 1. Case study interviewees
Company Role Number of Interviews
C3 Technologies Chairman of the board 2
Member of the board 1
Member of the board 
(Also Saab technology 
expert)
2
1st CEO 1
2nd CEO 1
Technology expert 1
Saab Technology expert 1
Technology expert 1
Head of Saab 
Corporate Ventures
2
The ideal speed of development is not 
simply a matter of clock time—being 
fastest—but rather a matter of finding 
the right time.
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As with all case studies, generalization to a larger popula-
tion is difficult. However, case studies are valuable as a means 
to gain insight into and enhance understanding of the char-
acteristics of a managerial issue. Understanding the role of 
timing in business model development will advance the prac-
tice and theoretic understanding of Lean Startup and help 
managers consider how best to explore the potential of exist-
ing technology in spinoff ventures.
Business Model Evolution at C3 Technologies
In 2011, the defense industry company Saab Technologies 
announced that it had sold its stake in C3 Technologies, a com-
pany it had spun off, for SEK 1.5 billion ($240 million). The 
buyer was later revealed to be Apple (Karlsberg 2011). This 
successful deal was the end result of a long process of business 
model evolution, from initial idea to functioning business model. 
Throughout this process, the new venture’s expansion emerged 
naturally as a response to market confirmations, rather than 
being pushed to match a preconceived timeline. Speed was 
never a focus; waiting for the right time to move the venture 
forward was the management team’s priority. Rather, Saab and 
the C3 management team sought to limit investor risk by focus-
ing on generating cash flow before making substantial invest-
ments. The evolution of C3 Technologies could be seen as 
occurring in four stages, from identifying latent value in the 
technology to confirming the potential of that value with cus-
tomers and building sales and partner networks to accelerating 
the development of the business model.
Exploring the Idea of Latent Value (late 2006–mid-2007)
Saab had developed an algorithm to generate 3D maps for 
military use. In 2006, an engineer raised the possibility that 
the algorithm could have civil applications. The response was 
positive; managers felt that it was worth making a small 
investment to test the idea. Saab’s management team made 
clear, however, that if the business did not generate revenue 
soon, it would have little interest in further investment.
To validate the potential for latent value, the head of Saab’s 
internal venture function recruited a consultant to investigate 
market opportunities. In a preliminary report, the consultant 
concluded that the technology could be the basis for a unique 
and very valuable company, although the potential target 
market was still unidentified. The consultant, who was an 
experienced salesperson, was hired on a short-term basis to 
develop the idea further and explore its potential. He quickly 
began to contact other companies to investigate their interest 
in 3D maps. He generated a range of applications and business 
ideas, such as surveillance of power grids. These ideas were 
discussed internally at Saab, but all of them fell short in terms 
of scalability. Selling 3D maps to a single customer on an 
irregular basis did not offer the potential of a large business. 
In the first half of 2007, however, a new idea surfaced from 
the team’s crafting of a draft business model, deduced from 
the clues from the market: to create 3D maps of major cities 
that could be resold repeatedly to a variety of users.
Confirming the Value Potential with Lead Customers 
(mid-2007–early 2008)
Seeking to confirm the potential value of the new business 
idea, the consultant tested different alternatives. One of those 
alternatives was the CEO of a telephone directory company, 
Hitta.se., who saw in the idea the potential for his company 
to gain market attention by offering a unique customer expe-
rience. Hitta.se signed a deal with Saab for the delivery of 3D 
maps of Stockholm. At the time the contract was signed, 
during the summer, the technology for the commercial solu-
tion was not ready. The schedule was tight: Hitta.se requested 
that the photographs be taken before the leaves fell in 
October. Saab dedicated a team to developing the algorithm 
to meet the commercial requirements, and a period of inten-
sive work followed. For Saab, the experience of the first deal 
provided confirmation that the project should continue; C3 
Technologies was established as a legal entity in early 2008.
Hence, the deal with Hitta.se, the first for the new tech-
nology, played a double role: it both confirmed the technol-
ogy’s commercial potential in a new market context and 
reoriented the new venture’s business model trajectory—
away from a focus on the technology per se and toward an 
intensified focus on user value. According to an interviewee 
at Saab, “The first deal was absolutely decisive for us. It 
defined a market for the technology and showed the potential 
for a scalable business.”
Building Sales Capacity and a Partner Network (2008)
In early 2008, when the company was founded, its only assets 
were access to a unique algorithm (still owned by Saab) for 
creating 3D maps and the experience of the first deal. There 
was no organization or plan for the business model, only a 
belief in the business’s potential and an urgent need to get 
the business running. The consultant who brokered the deal 
with Hitta.se was hired as CEO—and the first employee—of 
C3 Technologies in January 2008. Saab’s philosophy was that 
the new business should cover its own costs. As a result, the 
venture’s budget was tight. Consequently, C3 Technologies 
had to sell something it did not have, then build the produc-
tion capacity to meet customer expectations. The new CEO 
thus focused on building sales capacity rather than technical 
expertise, relying on Saab’s expertise in technology develop-
ment and imaging operations.
Another urgent task was the development of a network of 
partners to fill the gaps in the new company’s capabilities. 
Because C3 Technologies did not have the imaging equipment, 
operational processes, or people to fulfill its first contract, it 
had to rely on external partners to produce those first images. 
Speed was never a focus; waiting for the 
right time to move the venture forward 
was the priority.
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A company from the Netherlands was contracted to provide 
the photography equipment and a Norwegian company 
became the partner for organizing the flights. The company 
contracted with Saab, its parent firm, to produce the 3D maps. 
As one of the company’s managers pointed out, “We started 
off with a virtual resource base, relying heavily on external 
partners, including specialists from Saab.” Using an external 
network to actually provide the product was crucial in the 
beginning. It was cost-efficient, provided access to state-of-the-
art technologies in all phases of the process, and allowed the 
company the time to determine what resources it needed.
In early 2008, the first customer, Hitta.se, launched a map 
service based on C3 Technologies’ product. The successful 
debut drew media attention, to Hitta.se and to C3. The initial 
launch by Hitta.se also generated new deals with Hitta.se in 
Norway and Finland. Eniro, a major competitor with Hitta.
se, also showed interest in offering its customers maps gen-
erated by C3 Technologies.
After the first deals were made, the board debated about 
whether to start expanding the company. The debate was 
driven on one side by recognition of the company’s great 
potential and an understanding that the next step would be 
to aim for larger contracts in the global market. On the other 
side, there was reluctance to increase spending. The company 
had to prepare for further developments without overextend-
ing itself. Instead of expanding ahead of the market, the board 
decided to wait for new deals before extending its reach. One 
manager from Saab explained the philosophy: “To verify the 
market potential, it is best to let the new innovations starve. 
We do not invest ahead of the market, we invest in what the 
market has confirmed as valuable. Let the cash generated 
from real customers speak for itself.”
Accelerating the Business Model (2009–2011)
Market confirmation was crucial to the board’s approach to 
growing the new company, but the company had to act to 
achieve that market response. A new CEO, a leader with 
experience in building international technology companies, 
was recruited to enhance sales. The new CEO traveled fre-
quently to meet potential customers in Europe.
In 2010, with the goal of improving its map offering, Nokia 
asked C3 Technologies to produce 3D maps of 25 world cities. 
This deal, which was worth SEK 100 million (approximately 
$15 million), provided a strong indicator of the new venture’s 
substantial potential. It was time, the board decided, to start 
investing in developing the internal competencies needed to 
develop 3D maps independently. According to an interviewee 
at C3 Technologies, “Having competence within reach was 
crucial for the development of the company as the size of 
operations grew.”
The Nokia deal confirmed the company’s transformation 
from a Swedish startup to a global player in the map industry. 
Delivering a quality product to Nokia was the ultimate proof 
that it had found a viable business model. For the company’s 
board, it was the signal to start working toward an exit—a 
step completed with the sale of the company to Apple in 
September 2011.
Discussion
In retrospect, the development of the business model for C3 
Technologies followed a clear trajectory. The point of departure 
was the idea that a technology developed by the parent com-
pany had potential value in a market outside the parent’s usual 
reach. The consultant developed and tested various hypotheses 
about what that value might be, in the form of business ideas. 
Eventually, one of those ideas proved interesting enough to test. 
An early deal provided confirmation of the market value of that 
idea, generating a market-driven value proposition and defining 
target markets, not through a hypothesis but through real cus-
tomer behavior. Keeping fixed costs low by relying on partners 
to provide operational support gave the company time to deter-
mine its operational requirements while building a market. 
Finally, increasing confirmation from the market, in the form 
of more and larger deals, made expansion of internal operations 
not only reasonable but necessary, increasing fixed costs. At that 
point, it was time to draw conclusions about the final form of 
the business model and leave the exploratory phase. For C3 
Technologies and Saab, that meant an acquisition.
This evolution illustrates business model evolution char-
acterized by an experimental and cost-efficient approach 
using timing to maximize opportunities and minimize risks. 
Saab’s market-first approach enabled the new venture to be 
patient and await the right moment, identified by market 
confirmation, to invest in more costly resource compositions 
and market relationships. Three episodes standout as critical 
investment triggers that pushed the company to the next 
phase. First, the initial deal motivated the actual founding of 
the company and the establishment of a separate structure. 
Second, follow-on deals provided the motivation for further 
investment. And third, the Nokia deal triggered large invest-
ments in operational resources. Each trigger episode enhanced 
knowledge and confidence about the value-creating and val-
ue-capturing potential of the business model.
The case of C3 Technologies provides particular insight into 
how timing can be used to resolve uncertainty in the explo-
ration of the latent value of a high-potential technology. Rather 
than pushing the company into a development timeline, the 
leadership chose to wait for market relationships to mature and 
provide additional insight. This approach to market-based 
experimentation called for new steps that increase costs to be 
taken only when revenue streams were secured or at least very 
probable. In this context, timing refers not to clock timing but 
to a building awareness of the right time to act. It reflects a 
managerial attitude of waiting for events to develop rather than 
Timing can be used to resolve uncertainty 
in the exploration of the latent value of 
a high-potential technology.
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one of pushing for results. This ability to wait allowed the 
spinoff the time it needed to learn how to match the market 
capacity with a business model that allowed it to fully realize 
the potential of its technology while limiting its resource needs, 
thereby freeing it to seize opportunities when they appeared.
This conscious decision to be cautious and reactive and to 
allow the evolutionary processes to move toward the right 
moment for investment can be understood as managed timing. 
Managed timing should be understood as a conscious choice 
to manage business model evolution in cases when only time 
and actual customer engagement can dissolve uncertainty. It 
is a way of avoiding what McGrath (2010) calls the “black 
hole strategy” of investing in business models with uncertain 
future cash flows with high uncertainty. This kind of timing 
refers not to clock time but to “event-based time” (Kunisch 
et al. 2017). It is also associated with notions of windows of 
opportunity. This kind of timing does not preclude swift 
action when it is called for; rather, it is an alternative per-
spective on timing that allows space for the new venture to 
explore the business potential of latent values.
The underlying reason this approach may be effective is that 
the moment when sufficient learning will be achieved and 
opportunities will appear cannot be foreseen. The clock-time 
method of driving exploration of a spinoff’s business model to 
a set timeline may lead to premature conclusions on issues like 
the direction and business potential of a new venture. The 
unknowns may not be resolved before the deadlines simply 
because the time it takes to match technology with a market 
cannot be foreseen; the match has to appear, and it has to be 
grounded in learning about what a functioning business model 
looks like in the context of that match. Hence, being patient 
with clock time and allowing insights and relationships to 
mature enhances the potential of success.
This concept of managed timing adds new perspective to 
the Lean Startup literature, by suggesting the need for addi-
tional flexibility in the “fail fast” model. In many contexts, a 
new business model will need the flexibility to await the right 
moment to move forward and accrue the learning to see that 
moment when it arrives. More generally, as Kunisch and col-
leagues (2017) argued, there is a need to develop an enriched 
understanding of explicit time consideration in strategic change 
processes. The observations of managed timing make such a 
contribution in the context of enabling business model evolu-
tion in a cost-efficient and uncertainty-resolving manner.
Conclusion
The evolution of the spinoff business model shares charac-
teristics with Lean Startup principles (Reis 2011; York 2018). 
This study provides insight into the role of timing in business 
model evolution and the use of managed timing to realize 
the latent value of technology in markets outside the incum-
bent’s usual business lines. Understanding the role of timing 
in developing a functioning business model means under-
standing that the realization of the latent value of technology 
cannot be forced or rushed. It can happen only when the 
right opportunities present themselves, when the market 
conditions are right.
Practically, this case study adds to the understanding of how 
established companies may realize latent value through new 
business model evolution, using managed timing as a way to 
control risk and cost. In this approach, companies should invest 
little to get the first market confirmation and allow the size of 
subsequent orders to drive the size of subsequent investments. 
This managed timing approach can be used to navigate the 
thin line between rushing ahead, in reflexive response to clock-
time deadlines, and missing opportunities by quitting before 
the technology’s potential fully materializes.
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